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Abstract.
The paper investigates cross-country differences in wage mobility in Europe,
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density, the employment protection regulation and the welfare state regime on wage
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economic context and the aforementioned specific institutions explain a substantial
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21. Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a contribution to
the comparative study of wage mobility in Europe. More specifically, we
investigate the effect of labour market institutions on the cross-country
differences in wage mobility in Europe. Standard economic theory sug-
gests that the less important these institutions are in a country the
higher the volatility of wages. The effect of labour market institutions
can be measured in two ways. The first way is by studying the effect of
specific wage setting institutions (trade union density, collective bar-
gaining coverage and Employment Protection Legislation - EPL). The
second one is by using a classification of countries according to the
features of the labour market institutions. The classification we use is
an amended version of the classification of Esping-Andersen (1990).
The second aim of the paper is to account for the effect of the origin
state - the initial position in the wage distribution - on wage mobility.
For this purpose, we apply a novel approach in modelling wage mo-
bility. Economists typically use individual level data to investigate the
determinants of absolute changes in wages. Other approaches rooted
mainly in sociology - but not only - use mobility measures though their
main interest is in aggregate changes in earnings. For these approaches,
relative income changes matter more (Runciman, 1966; Duesenberry,
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1967; Easterlin, 1974; Brickman et al., 1978; Fritzell, 1990). Regardless
of the approach, most studies do not account for the fact that wage
mobility can be different in different parts of the wage distribution.
Workers from the various parts of the wage distribution may differ
in the type of jobs they perform and in their investments in human
capital. In this paper, we apply an approach that uses individual level
data to derive a macro-level measure for wage mobility accounting for
the initial position in the wage distribution. Our mobility measure is
the year-to-year transition matrix between deciles of the wage distri-
bution. We model this measure of positional mobility with a variant
of the multinomial logit model using restrictions that are typical for
the log-linear approach. These restrictions allow us to estimate the
parameters of a model that would otherwise involve the estimation of
a huge number of transition tables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the comparative
research on wage mobility. Section 3 elaborates on the measure of mobil-
ity and the measures of institutions that are used in this paper. Section
4 deals with the data and sampling from the European Community
Household Panel. Section 5 presents the restricted multinomial logit
model and section 6 discusses the parameter estimates of the analysis.
The main conclusions of the study as well as the issues for further
research are discussed in the final section (section 7) of the paper.
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42. Theory and research on wage mobility patterns
The idea that labour market institutions such as union power, employ-
ment protection and minimum wages tend to decrease wage mobility is
well established in economics. Standard economic suggests that these
labour market institutions reduce job mobility as well as inflows into
the labour market (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Bertola, 1990; Lazear,
1990). These institutions safeguard primarily the employment and the
wages of the individuals that are already in the labour market - the
‘insiders’ - at the cost of the unemployed and the inactive. In the US
and the UK, where labour market institutions were weak, wages were
allowed to adjust downwards during recession and unemployment did
not rise, while in continental Europe, where institutions were strong,
wages remained rigid and unemployment increased.
However, recent empirical research provides evidence against the
predictions of standard economic theory. Dickens (2000) finds evidence
of high and increasing (since the 1970s) levels of immobility, especially
among the low paid, in the UK. Burkhauser et al. (1997) find ‘a great
deal of persistence’ and a similar pattern of mobility in the US and in
Germany, despite the fact that the welfare systems and the labour mar-
kets of the two countries differ significantly. Aaberge et al. (2002) reach
the same conclusion comparing the US with Scandinavian countries. A
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common finding for many countries is that wage mobility is low at the
lower parts of the distribution. Using panel data from the Survey on
Households Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy, Cappellari (2002)
finds high levels of immobility among the low paid Italian workers.
Buchinsky et al. (1998) corroborate these results for the French work-
ers. However, no study has ever investigated analytically wage mobility
at the different parts of the wage distribution.
3. Measuring mobility and institutions
The measure of positional mobility
The aim of this paper is to investigate differences in wage mobility
between countries as well as between the various parts of the wage dis-
tribution. The latter can only be achieved with the use of a measure of
mobility that is based on micro-level data. For this purpose, our aggre-
gate positional mobility measure is based on the year-to-year transitions
of working individuals across deciles of the wage distribution within
each country1. This measure has been extensively used in the literature
(Burkhauser et al., 1997; Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999; Dickens, 2000). As
far as theory is concerned, this measure bridges the economic with the
sociological/psychological approach on income mobility (Pavlopoulos,
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62007). Hirsch (1995) suggests that even if an individual cared only for
the purchasing power of his own income - as economists suggest -, his
rank in the distribution still matters, as it determines his ability to
acquire ‘positional’ (goods whose assigned value depends on how many
other possess them) or status goods.
Table I. 10 by 10 transition matrix for wage
mobility
Destination decile
Origin
decile


x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 ... x1,10
x2,1 x2,2 x2,3 ... x2,10
x3,1 x3,2 x3,3 ... x3,10
: : : :
x10,1 x10,2 x10,3 ... x10,10


Our aim is particularly to explain the 10×10 table (Table I), where
cells represent frequencies. The index for the rows denotes the decile
position in year 1, while the index for the columns represents the decile
position in year 2. In a society with perfect mobility (PM) all cells per
row have the same value (xi,k =
∑
10
j=1
xi,j
10 , for each k = 1, ..., 10 ),
while in a perfectly immobile society (PI) all off-diagonal elements of
the table are zero ( xij = 0 , if i 6= j ). In our analysis, individuals
whose destination state differs up to one decile from the origin state
are considered immobile, because a transition of one decile could be
the result of a light level of churning in the wage distribution.
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The measure of institutional constraints
The most straightforward way to measure the effect of labour market
institutions is to examine to what extent these institutions and regula-
tions have a bearing on cross-country variation in wage mobility. OECD
(2004) suggests that the main wage-setting institutions are minimum
wages, trade union density, as well as collective bargaining coverage,
centralization and co-ordination.2 The problem that we face is that
there are no reliable measures for the majority of these institutions
that can allow us to make cross-country comparisons. Union density
and collective bargaining coverage are measured by the OECD, but
the relevant levels seem more an approximation than a ’hard figure’ for
many countries. Minimum wage regulations are determined at various
levels (industry, region, national) in different countries. This makes
cross-country comparison of minimum wage levels practically unfea-
sible. As for bargaining centralization and coordination, no generally
accepted measure exists. Therefore, we only include in our analysis
measures for union density and collective bargaining.
Our expectations are that extensive collective bargaining coverage
prevents wages from being too volatile in the low and the middle parts
of the wage distribution. We expect union density to have a similar
but weaker effect since in some countries, such as Denmark and Fin-
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8land, being a member of a union provides entitlement to unemployment
benefit.
A second way is to use the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) (OECD, 1999). This index is based on hiring and firing regula-
tions and on criteria concerning the employment protection legislation
for regular employment, temporary employment and collective dis-
missal. A low value of this index in a country indicates that there is a
low level of employment protection, and therefore there are few barriers
for job changes. Since workers change jobs easier in such a country, their
wage will also change more often. In such a country, wage mobility will
‘ceteris paribus’ be also higher than in countries with a higher EPL
index.
Finally, a third way of testing the effect of labour market institu-
tions is by using country clustering. Even when the institutions do not
seem to differ considerably across countries, the dissimilarities emerge
more outspokenly across particular groups of countries. Classifying
countries in clusters or regime types is a quite common approach in
comparative studies on income and welfare policies. Probably the most
commonly used classification is the Esping-Andersen’s regime type clas-
sification (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This classification is based on his
socio-political account of welfare state policies during the 1960s and
1970s and the degree of de-commodification and stratification of labour
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caused by these policies. This degree of de-commodification is interre-
lated with regulations that control the volatility of wages (minimum
wage, employment protection regulations, collective wage bargaining,
union density etc.) and public interventions that prevent the labour
market from operating as a fully competitive market. Our classification
that resembles the classification of Esping-Andersen (1990), clusters 12
European countries in four regime types. Countries with a more flexible
labour market due to relatively low levels of employment regulation,
such as the UK and Ireland that are believed to exhibit a high level of
wage mobility. Southern European countries; namely Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain that are believed to exhibit low levels of wage mobility
due to the strictness of their employment protection legislation. The
continental European countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
- for which we expect to find low levels of wage mobility due to their
strongly regulated labour market. Finally, in Scandinavian countries
and in the Netherlands, notwithstanding the high union density and the
high level of compliance to collective wage bargaining, wages are more
flexible than in the strongly regulated continental countries, but less
flexible than the lowly-regulated labour markets of the liberal countries
(Muffels and Fouarge, 2002; Muffels and Luijkx, 2006).
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4. Data, main concepts and some descriptives
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which
is designed by EUROSTAT for income study purposes. This is a lon-
gitudinal database that contains comparable socio-economic data for
individuals and households from 15 European countries and for eight
years, namely from 1994 to 2001. It includes information for approx-
imately 60,000 households and 130,000 individuals per wave (EURO-
STAT, 2001). However, some countries (Austria and Finland) lack data
for the first or for the first two waves, as they stepped in later. Due
to artifacts in the income data we exclude Belgium, Luxembourg and
Sweden. The first wave of ECHP (1994) is excluded from our analysis
as, in the view of EUROSTAT, the income data for the first wave (1994)
are much less robust than the data for the consecutive waves. Hence,
our sample consists of 7 waves and 12 countries.
The sample is restricted to male wage earners between 25 and 55
years old, appearing in the dataset for at least two subsequent years
and declaring paid employment as their main economic activity for the
year prior to the survey. We exclude female workers as they tend to
have more career breaks and more intermittent periods of temporary
or permanent lay-off for very different reasons than males (e.g. caring
obligations). Controlling for these different career paths goes beyond
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the scope of this paper. Finally, in order to reduce measurement error,
we trim the wage distribution by excluding individuals that have less
than 10% or more than 3,000% of the median wage income.
Our main economic variable is the total income from paid employ-
ment. This is the total personal net labour income after deduction of
taxes and social security contributions, with the reference year being
the year prior to the survey. In order to construct our sample, we
rank the wage income of individuals according to their decile position
within a country, and we examine the transitions between the decile
positions across year t and t+1. Our sample population consists of
12,709 individuals for the first pair of years (1995-1996), 13,746 for the
second (1996-1997), 13,193 for the third (1997-1998), 15,379 for the
fourth (1998-1999), 14,533 for the fifth (1999-2000) and 14,173 for the
last (2000-2001). From now on, the time points of our analysis will cor-
respond to the year from which the data come from. For example when
we refer to time point 1998-1999 data come from wave 7 (1999-2000)
of the ECHP.
Some descriptives
A basic overview of the decile transitions is given in Table II. This table
presents the origin-destination transitions pooled across countries and
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Table II. Overall year-to-year transitions in percentages
Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SUM
Origin
decile
1 53.0 23.7 8.7 5.0 3.4 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.4 100
2 10.2 51.1 21.4 7.4 4.0 2.7 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.2 100
3 3.3 18.1 58.3 0.3 9.9 4.8 2.8 1.5 0.7 0.3 100
4 1.3 4.1 15.4 42.1 22.1 8.2 3.8 1.8 0.8 0.3 100
5 1.0 2.1 4.9 17.0 40.6 21.6 7.9 3.1 1.3 0.5 100
6 0.6 1.2 2.2 5.3 17.4 40.7 21.8 7.3 2.8 0.8 100
7 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.3 5.5 16.9 43.4 21.8 6.3 1.4 100
8 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 5.8 16.8 47.9 20.8 3.8 100
9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.1 4.3 16.8 58.0 16.2 100
10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.3 2.5 13.6 80.4 100
Transitions are pooled over the countries and the years.
time periods. The main finding of this table is a significant amount
of persistence, especially at the low-wage- and high-wage strata. Low-
wage- and high-wage earners experience hardly any wage change in a
one-year period. The relevant tables by regime type3 show that wage
earners in the Nordic countries (including the Netherlands) are appar-
ently more mobile than average, while in the lowly-regulated (liberal)
countries, workers are seemingly less mobile than average. In the South-
ern European countries mobility rates emerge higher than average,
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at least in the higher income strata. The lowest mobility levels are
observed in the Continental European countries.
The data that we use in our analysis consist of a separate observed
transition table per country (12 countries), time (6 time points: 1994-
1995 up to and including 1999-2000), sector (2 sectors: private and
public), and education (3 groups: completed education lower than high
school, high school, and higher education) combination. As information
on two countries is missing for the first time point and on one coun-
try for the second time point, we have in total 414 (instead of 432)
transition tables. It should be noted that for the construction of these
transition matrices, deciles were defined per country and time combi-
nation. This means that the same definition applies across education
and sector groups (within country-time combinations).
5. A restricted multinomial logit analysis
The standard practice in much of the (economic) research on wage
mobility involves the estimation of a probit model. However, a model
to analyse positional mobility should take into account the origin state
from which a transition takes place, the size and the direction of a
transition (i.e. whether it is an upward or downward transition). This
wageMobility_QQ_revised.tex; 10/10/2007; 11:58; p.13
14
could be done, for example, by means of an ordered probit model. In
this case, however, such an approach would require a large number of
separate regressions.4 For this reason, we have opted for a method that
can account for all these aspects in a single analysis and therefore is
much more flexible than the probit approach. This method includes
the application of a variant of the multinomial logit model that applies
log-bilinear restrictions that are typically used in the log-linear anal-
ysis field. We specify a multinomial logit model for the probability
that an individual is in a particular destination (D) state (decile)
given his origin (O) state (his state in the previous year) and the
subgroup (G) to which he belongs. This probability will be denoted by
P (D = d|O = o,G = g) . With ‘subgroup’ we mean one of the afore-
mentioned 414 time, country, education, and sector combinations. The
basic structure of the multinomial logit model we use is:
P (D = d|O = o,G = g) =
exp
(
β
D|G
d|g + β
OD|G
od|g
)
10∑
i=1
exp
(
β
D|G
i|g + β
OD|G
oi|g
) . (1)
This model contains two types of regression parameters: β
D|G
d|g and
β
OD|G
od|g . The term β
D|G
d|g is an intercept term for the destination state
D=d that may differ across subgroups. The other parameter - β
OD|G
od|g -
captures the strength of the origin-destination association that may also
differ across subgroups. In our application, the term of main interest is
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this origin-destination association term. The size of this term indicates
the degree of mobility (the smaller the association between the origin
and destination state, the greater the mobility). What we are especially
interested in is how much the size of this term varies across subgroups
defined by country, time, sector, and education. However, by not further
restricting the β
OD|G
od|g term, we would have to estimate and interpret
81 (=9*9) association parameters for each of the 414 tables, which is,
of course, not meaningful. For such situations, where there is a large
number of association parameters (81 in this case) that vary across
large numbers of subgroups (414 in this case), in the log-linear mod-
eling field, restrictions have been proposed for specifying parsimonious
higher-order interaction terms. These methods that involve the use of
bilinear decompositions, have been applied among others in the analysis
of mobility tables (Hout, 1983; Luijkx, 1994; Vermunt, 1997b; Goodman
and Hout, 1998; Goodman and Hout, 2001). In our case, the following
bilinear decomposition is used: β
OD|G
od|g = a
OD
od + b
OD
od · φ
G
g . This decom-
position implies that the various tables have a common component aODod
, which serves as a kind of intercept or overall mean association term.
The other component bODod · φ
G
g captures the differences in the origin-
destination associations across tables, where the parameters bODod can
be regarded as ‘slopes’ of the explanatory variables’ effects; they indi-
cate in which parts of the mobility table the largest differences across
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subgroups occur. The term φGg is a scaling factor indicating whether
mobility is higher or lower than average in a particular subgroup. In
other words, differences in mobility across tables are described by a
single coefficient per table. For reasons of normalization, we have to
impose a location and a scaling restriction on the φGg parameters. Here,
we will use
∑
g
φGg = 0 and
∑
g
(
φGg
)2
= 1 , which implies that the φGg
parameters are centered and restricted to have a sum of squares of 1.
For our analysis, we made use of the program lEM (Vermunt, 1997a).
Table III illustrates the values of the log-likelihood function and the
BIC obtained by the various models that were estimated. The first
two models serve as baseline models. In Model 0, both the aODod and
bODod terms are restricted to be equal to zero, which yields a model
in which the destination state is assumed to be independent of the
origin state. Model 1 assumes that bODod is equal to zero for each o-d
combination, yielding a homogeneous association model. Comparison
of the log-likelihood and BIC values of Models 0 and 1 shows that the
origin and destination states of individuals in the wage distribution
are strongly correlated. Model 2, in which we use the bilinear decom-
position described above, fits much better than Model 1 in terms of
the log-likelihood, indicating that the origin-destination association is
not equal across tables. In Models 3 to 6, we use several simplifying
assumptions for the term bODod . Among these models, the model that fits
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Table III.: Comparison of the models
Model Restrictions on a and b Parameters Log-likelihood BIC
0 Independence aODod = b
OD
od = 0 7,776 -368,598 825,482
1 Homogeneous association bODod = 0 7,938 -310,472 711,068
2 General no 8,368 -307,350 717,779
3 Diagonal bODod = 0 if o 6= d 8,297 -309,083 712,367
4 Diagonal and 1 decile transition bODod = 0 if o− d > 1 and b
OD
od = b
OD
do 8,306 -308,560 711,423
5 Diagonal and 2 deciles transition bODod = 0 if o− d > 2 and b
OD
od = b
OD
do 8,314 -308,534 711,462
6 Symmetric associations bODod = b
OD
do 8,341 -308,517 711,734
4a Only significant interaction effects as Model 4 7,984 -308,910 708,466
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best according to the BIC criterion, Model 4, contains only nonzero bODod
parameters for the main diagonal and the first subdiagonals, while the
subdiagonal parameters are also restricted to be symmetrical (equal for
upward and downward moves across the two same states). This model
does not only present the best fit to the data according to the statistical
indices, but it is also straightforward in its interpretation; Model 4
captures country differences in immobility (i.e. in the probability of
changing at most one decile).
Nevertheless, Models 2-6 fit worse than the homogeneous model
(Model 1) in terms of the BIC. This is probably due to the large number
of parameters included in these models. Therefore, a more parsimonious
version of Model 4 (Model 4a) was employed in which insignificant
predictor effects have been omitted.5 Model 4a fits much better than
the homogeneous model in terms of log-likelihood and BIC values.
Findings for model 4a seem to establish the existence of differences in
origin-destination association between tables defined by the predictors.
Since the coefficient estimates were the same for models 4 and 4a, it
was decided to use estimates from model 4 since all effects (both the
significant and the non-significant) are informative with respect to our
expectations.
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Table IV. Coefficients showing how much transition tables differ (bODod )
Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Origin
decile
1 -6.38 -7.84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 -7.84 -16.87 -9.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 -9.71 -14.78 -8.96 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 -8.96 -15.99 -9.14 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 -9.14 -15.68 -10.75 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 -10.75 -16.22 -8.18 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 -8.18 -15.87 -10.74 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10.74 -22.33 -14.87 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -14.87 -27.78 -19.41
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -19.41 -32.14
6. Parameter estimates from the multinomial logit analysis
The estimates for the coefficients aODod
6 confirm the descriptive results
that were presented in table II; a U-shaped patterns for wage mobility
with low levels of mobility for the low and the high parts of the distri-
bution and somewhat higher levels of mobility for the middle part of
the distribution. The question that has to be addressed is how much
the mobility pattern differs across countries. In Table IV, the estimates
for the bODod coefficients obtained with Model 4 are presented. Each of
the coefficients that is not a priori fixed to zero takes on a negative
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value; therefore these coefficients denote the tendency towards more
mobility. This implies that a positive φGg value corresponds to more
wage mobility than average in the relevant table. The pattern of the
estimates for bODod shows that differences across subgroups (countries,
time points, education and sector groups) are larger with respect to
the mobility in the higher wage deciles (-32.14) than in the lower ones
(-6.38).
The 414 φGg coefficients obtained with Model 4 describe the dif-
ferences across countries, time points, education groups, and sectors
of employment. However, the interpretation of all φGg coefficients is
still unfeasible due to their large number. Therefore, φGg coefficients
were subjected to a further analysis in order to establish which of the
main and interaction effects included among them, are worth being
thoroughly scrutinized and interpreted. More precisely, an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was performed, the results of which are reported
in Table V. The first result is that the higher-order interaction terms
are of little importance as the model with main effects and two-way
interaction effects explains 77.6% of the variance in the φGg terms. Sec-
ondly, country is by far the most important factor in the explanation of
mobility differences across tables (its main effect accounts for 51.3% of
the total variance). This might be an important result as it shows that
it is not so much the common trends and structural factors explaining
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Table V. Analysis of Variance for the country effects
Dependent Variable: Number of obs = 414 R-squared 0.776
EFFECT Root MSE = 0.028 Adj R-squared 0.683
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 0.776 121 0.006 8.4 0
Country 0.513 11 0.047 60.8 0
Time 0.014 5 0.003 3.6 0
Education 0.002 2 0.001 1.1 0.32
Sector 0.053 1 0.053 69.4 0
Country*Education 0.046 22 0.002 2.7 0
Country*Time 0.087 52 0.002 2.2 0
Country*Sector 0.038 11 0.003 4.6 0
Time*Education 0.004 10 0.000 0.6 0.84
Time*Sector 0.002 5 0.000 0.6 0.71
Education*Sector 0.006 2 0.003 3.7 0.03
Residual 0.224 292 0.001
Total 1 413 0.002
Note: the variables included in the ANOVA are country, time, time-country
interaction, education (low, high school, higher) and sector (public, private).
the dissimilarities in wage mobility but primarily the particular country
characteristics indicating the relevance of institutional, socio-economic
(education, demography, employment structure) and also cultural ex-
planations. Moreover, we find that differences between the mobility
patterns in the public and private sectors are important determinants
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of the observed variance (5.3%). The time effect is not significant, while
the country-time interaction component is, explaining about 8.7% of
the variation. The findings for education are similar; even though no
direct education effects are found, the country-education interaction
effect explains a significant part of the overall variance (4.6%). Also
sector and the country-sector interaction explain a noticeable part
of the variance. Again this points to the significant impact that the
employment structure exerts on wage mobility patterns.7
Figure 1. The mean effect of country on wage mobility
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Figure 1 depicts the mean value of φGg per country in the period of
reference. As can be seen, there is no clear pattern that could associate
cross-country differences with regimes types. The hypothesis that in
less regulated countries individuals experience higher levels of wage
mobility is confirmed in the case of Ireland but has to be rejected in the
case of the prototype of a lowly-regulated country in Europe, the UK. In
this country, wage mobility is lower than in most other EU countries.
This difference between the UK and Ireland is probably due to the
fact that the Irish economy experienced an economic boost during the
1990s. In most Southern European countries that have a rather high
level of employment protection, wage mobility is higher than most
other countries. However, Portugal exhibits the lowest level of wage
mobility of all European countries. Except for Portugal and the UK,
low levels of wage mobility are found for France and Finland, which are
classified as belonging to the strongly-regulated continental regime or,
like Finland, to the rather flexible Nordic countries. Finland therefore
does not fit particularly well in this Nordic picture, probably because
its labour market is much less flexible than its peers in this cluster
combined with its underperforming economy during this period. The
picture for Denmark, which presents one of the highest levels of wage
mobility, confirms our prior conjectures for the Nordic regime. This
might be explained by the fact that the Danish labour market seems to
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be particularly successful in combining high levels of flexibility, while
safeguarding simultaneously appropriate levels of income and work or
employment security through active and activating labour market pol-
icy programmes (OECD, 2004). The strongly-regulated Austria and
Germany are positioned somewhere in the middle of the league table
of countries. A similar position is taken by the Netherlands, which we
classified as also belonging to the Nordic cluster, with medium levels
of regulation and a fairly favorable balance between wage flexibility on
the one hand, and income and work security on the other.
The effects of labour market institutions
The results presented above indicate that countries belonging to the
same country cluster according to our regime classification do not
necessarily show similar mobility patterns. In order to obtain a more
formal test as to whether the regime typology or the specific wage-
setting institutions explain cross-country differences in wage mobility,
some additional ANOVA modelling was performed, in which country
was replaced by regime type, the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) index, the union density and the collective bargaining coverage.
Moreover, three time-varying macroeconomic indicators were added to
the model as covariates: the Labour Force Participation rate for men
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Table VI.: Percentage of variance explained
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 8
Country Union Collective EPL Regime Institutions
Country and macro density bargaining and macro and macro macro and
and macro and macro interactions
Country 52.1 52.1
Regime 13
EPL 7.1 7.1
Density 0.3 3.5
Coverage 3 0.1
Macro 0.3 1.3 0.3 6.5 5 5.5
Institution*institutiona 26.8
R2 77.6 77.6 11.8 14.8 34 29.9 52.1
Note: the cell entries are the percentages of the variance of the effects estimated in the multinomial logit regression that are
explained by the variables included in this table. These percentages were estimated with ANOVA regressions. The rest of
the variables included in the ANOVA were the same as in table V.
a This adds the percentage of the variance that is explained by the interactions between the measures of institutions - EPL,
coverage and density.
w
a
g
e
M
o
b
i
l
i
t
y
_
Q
Q
_
r
e
v
i
s
e
d
.
t
e
x
;
1
0
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
7
;
1
1
:
5
8
;
p
.
2
5
26
between 15-64 years old (LFP), the unemployment rate for males and
the GDP per capita (GDPpc). These indicators are included in order
to explain country differences that are related to the business cycle.
The main results of these ANOVA models are presented in Table
VI. The baseline model (Model 1) is the model described in Table V.
This model has an overall explained variance of 77.6%. The inclusion
of macroeconomic indicators leaves the explained variance practically
unchanged (Model 2). As far as the wage-setting institutions are con-
cerned, if we were to replace country by any of the direct measures
of these institutions, the explained variance drops dramatically. The
model with union density (Model 3) explains only 11.8% of the overall
variance, and the model with bargaining coverage (Model 4) explains
14.8% of the overall variance. This indicates that although bargaining
coverage is a better indicator of wage mobility than union density, these
two indicators explain only a small part of cross-country differences.
EPL (Model 5) performs better (34%), but is still unable to explain a
large part of the cross-country variation. However, if we include all the
direct measures of labour market institutions together in the ANOVA
model, the explained variance increases to 52.1%. Thus, our measures
for labour market institutions explain two thirds of the overall variance
that is explained by country.
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‘Regime type’ seems to perform slightly better than union density
and bargaining coverage but worse than the EPL index. Nevertheless,
replacing country with our regime type (Model 6) still results into a
considerable reduction of the explained variance (29.9%), compared to
model 1. Nevertheless, the significant part of the country variance that
is explained by the regime type indicates that the way flexibility and
income and work security is balanced plays a role in explaining country
differences even after controlling for a number of important macroeco-
nomic indicators. Moreover, the fact that the EPL index and regime
typology perform better than single-institution indicators shows that
wage mobility at the country level is a complex issue that is affected
by several policies and institutional arrangements.
Figure 2 shows that the ranking of regime types varies across time
points. The only expectation that is clearly confirmed is that wage
mobility levels in the strongly-regulated regime (continental European
countries) are lower than in all other regimes. In the southern strongly-
regulated regime, wage mobility was initially high in the beginning
of the period, in 1994-95, but decreased considerably thereafter, until
1998-1999, to rise again in the year after. In the Nordic countries,
wage mobility was initially quite high, until 1996; but decreased, to
catch up again strongly until 1999. In 1999-2000, it even ranked first
among all regimes. Individuals from the very flexible liberal regime
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Figure 2. The effect of regime type on wage mobility across time
experience higher rates of wage mobility than individuals from the
strongly-regulated continental regime but lower rates than the Nordic
regime. It should, however, be noted that we need to be cautious in
drawing conclusions on the basis of these regime findings only, since
our evidence shows that there are large cross-country differences within
the various regime types. On the other hand, the outcomes highlight
a common trend; during the economic upturn period in the mid- and
late-1990s, wage mobility rates tended to decline unexpectedly and to
recover in some regimes (the Nordic and the Southern) only at the very
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end of the period. The slow wage mobility growth during this period
might be due to the rather low levels of flexibility and job mobility in
the European labour markets.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we applied a restricted multinomial logit regression model
to investigate cross-country differences in relative positional wage mo-
bility in Europe, using data from the ECHP for 1995-2001. The method
we applied was sufficiently powerful to allow us to control for the full
set of origin states of individuals in the year-to-year transitions. It also
was flexible enough to impose a variety of restrictions to the association
parameters of our model, which enabled us to interpret the covariate
effects and their time patterns. Both properties of our approach are
unique compared to the standard (probit) regression techniques.
At the individual level, our findings suggest that controlling for
the origin state is crucial when studying wage mobility. We found an
inverse U-shaped pattern of wage volatility for the different parts of
wage distribution. Low levels of mobility emerge for the lowest and the
highest strata of the wage distribution. A low-wage earner jumping to
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a highly paid managerial job, or a firm manager with a very high wage
degraded to a minimum wage worker is a rather unlikely event.
At the country level, striking differences emerge compared with our
expectations. Labour market institutions go some way to explain a
part of these differences. In countries with a liberal labour market,
where there are few institutional barriers, increased income risks do
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with better wage prospects for work-
ers. On the contrary, we find that more flexibility in wages emerges in
countries that combine flexibility in the labour market with a high level
of income security (the Nordic countries lead by Denmark). Contrary
to our expectations, we found a high level of wage mobility in countries
with strong employment protection - the Southern European countries,
with the exception of Portugal. A possible explanation for this could
be that the low level of wage mobility in the external labour market
is counterbalanced by a high level of in-firm or in-job wage mobility.
Another explanation involves the existence of a large informal sector
in the Southern European labour markets that might also exert a sim-
ilar up-leveling effect on wage mobility. Our conjectures are largely
corroborated with respect to the finding that the strictly-regulated
continental European countries ensure high levels of wage stability for
workers. However, although this clustering of countries in regime types
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can account for a part of the cross-country differences in wage mobility,
significant variation remains within the regime clusters.
The testing of specific measures of labour market institutions showed
that these measures account for the largest part of cross-country varia-
tion in wage mobility. The role of labour market institutions in explain-
ing cross-country differences in wage mobility becomes more important
if we consider that the effect of country is considerably overestimated
by our analysis. Our restricted multinomial logit model does not allow
us to account for the effect of many variables at the individual level.
Therefore, country also captures some variation of wage mobility that
is actually due to differences at the individual level.
Contrary to the direct measures of labour market institutions, the
regime typology explains a small part of cross-country variation (29.9%).
The lesson to be learned from this is that multiple indicators for in-
stitutional variation and the macroeconomic performance of countries
should be taken into account to explain wage mobility patterns. There-
fore, a regime type classification can only be effective if it takes these
multiple indicators into account.
Further research is needed to investigate the effect of labour market
institutions on wage mobility. Better measures for the wage-setting
institutions are necessary. The direct measures of labour market insti-
tutions that were used were time-constant for the period of reference,
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while the regime typologies may also partly reflect country differences
that are driven by factors other than institutions, such as cultural
differences.
Notes
1 In order to test for the sensitivity of our analysis with respect to the clustering
of incomes in deciles we repeated our analysis by clustering incomes in 20 categories.
Results showed that country differences did not change.
2 Trade union density refers to the percentages of workers that are members of a
trade union. Collective bargaining coverage is the fraction of workers that is covered
by collective employment agreements. Collective bargaining centralization refers
to the degree that the wage bargaining between unions and employers is central-
ized. Collective bargaining coordination refers to the degree that wage bargaining
in all levels (company, industry, country) is coordinated by union and employers
confederations.
3 These tables can be found in Pavlopoulos et al. (2005).
4 More specifically, let us allow for 3 categories for the size of the move (moving
0, 1, 2 or more deciles). Then, since we have 10 origin states (deciles), 2 directions of
the move (upward, downward) and 3 categories for the size of the move, we would
have to perform 60 different regressions.
5 The significance of the effects of model 4 is discussed later in this section.
6 These estimates can be found in Pavlopoulos et al. (2005).
7 Extensive discussion on the effect of education and sector of employment on
wage mobility can be found in Pavlopoulos et al. (2005).
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